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ABSTRACT
Carrying capabilities of drones and their easy accessibility to the public have led to an increase in
crimes committed using drones in recent years. For this reason, the need for forensic analysis of
drones captured from the crime scenes and the devices used for these drones is also paramount.
This paper presents the extraction and identification of important artefacts from the recorded
flight data as well as the associated mobile devices using open source tools and some basic scripts
developed to aid the analysis of two popular drone systems- the DJI Phantom 3 Professional and
Parrot AR. Drone 2.0. Although different drones vary in their operations, this paper extends the
extraction and analysis of the data from the drones and associated devices using some generic
methods which are forensically sound adhering to the guidelines of the Association of Chief Police
Officers (ACPO).
Keywords: Digital forensics, Drone forensics, Open source tools, DJI Phantom, AR Drone 2.0.

l. INTRODUCTION
Drones, also known as unmanned aerial
vehicles (U AV) , are being increasingly popular
amongst public due to their accessibility and
affordability. This popularity is not only
helping in rapid growth of global commercial
market of UAVs (Majendie & Chia, 2018;
Moskwa, 2016) but also inevitably increasing
drone crimes (Yeung, 2016). The carrying
capabilities of drones over long distances
(UAV, 2018) and their remote operation make
drones ideal for transport of contraband, also
known as smuggling (BBC, 2016; Yeung,
2016) , the most widely committed drone crime.
This type of drone crime has become prolific in
the UK and around the world (Dinan, 2017;
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Mikelionis, 2018), such as dropping weapons,
phones, drugs into prisons or delivering drugs
or sometimes arms in and out of a country
bypassing borders. As well as smuggling, the
camera mounted onto a drone, either as a
static recording or a live streaming device,
raises significant data privacy concerns for
organisations and public. Also, the ability of
drones capturing pictures or videos of
operations in designated no-fly-zone areas of
airspace (CAA, 2015), such as, airports,
military base and power stations, presents a
significant security threat. Drone-mounted
cameras are also being used for traditional
crime such as burglary (Barrett, 2015;
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Siddique, 2017). Furthermore, drones are being
utilised as deadly weapons m countries
involved in conflict. Mostly hovering-type
drones such as the DJI Phantom or similar, are
used in these type of attacks (Rambling, 2017;
Waters, 2017).
Due to the rise in criminal activities, the
need for forensic analysis of the captured
drones has augmented immensely. After
capturing the drone, a forensic analysis can
provide a lot of information about the
potential suspect of a crime based on the data
gathered from on-board sensors and other
electronics that assist with flight and
navigation, as well as the camera and digital
storage. This can also help in preventing
further crime. Interpreting the flight data and
tackling the multi-platform nature of drones
are the major challenges in forensic analysis of
drones. This paper presents the extraction and
interpretation of important artefacts found in
the recorded flight logs on both the internal
memory of the U AV and the controlling
application, as well as analysis of media logs
and other important files for identifying
artefacts with the use of open source tools as
they are flexible and meet guidelines on the
admissibility of evidence (Carrier, 2002).
Additionally, some basic scripts will be used to
aid the forensic analysis of two commercially
popular drone systems, demonstrating the
potential for developing more robust forensic
tools applicable to other platforms. The chosen
drones for analysis are -the DJI Phantom 3
Professional (DJI, 2018) and Parrot AR. Drone
2.0 Power Edition (Parrot, 2017), for ease of
subsequent reference the drones are designated
as DJI and A.R respectively throughout the
paper. The DJI is a quadcopter drone with a
variety of features and capabilities and
dominating with 70% and Parrot A.R is in
second with 7% of market share among
commercially available drones (Valentak,
2017). These drones are different in their
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operation and their capabilities and some
generic methods reported in (Barton & Azhar,
2018) will be applied in this paper for the
analysis and comparison of results between
the two drone models.
The remainder of the paper is organised as
follows: Section 2 reviews the existing research
in relation to forensic analysis of drones,
Section 3 discusses the methodology used to
analyse the drones and accompanying mobile
platform. In Section 4 results of the analysis
are reported and finally Section 5 concludes
the paper.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
A forensic analysis of U AV system using
Parrot Bebop UAV is reported in (Horsman,
2016). The author highlighted some key areas
of analysis including acquisition of data,
establishing flight data and the ownership,
these pose a variety of challenges to the digital
forensic investigators. Firstly, the presence of
identifying artefacts such as name and address
is not essential for drone operation, it is
possible to operate a drone with little or no
identifying artefacts left on it. Which is in
complete contrast to forensic investigation
involving mobile devices where an abundance
of personal information is available in the
devices. Secondly, to re-create the actions
taken by the drone, interpretation of the
recorded flight data is essential, which is not a
likely skillset of forensic investigator. At a
minimum, the understanding of timestamped
latitude, longitude and altitude measurements
is required, as well as speed, battery level and
other data from a host of possible on-board
sensors.
Modern drone systems are comprised of a
number of hardware platforms, which makes
drones a valuable source of forensic artefacts,
creating the need for forensic research into the
area.
Some of these component platforms
contain physically identifiable artefacts such as
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serial numbers printed on the casing, which
can later be matched up to artefacts recovered
using digital forensics (Kovar, Dominguez , &
Murphy, 2015). Another work (Maarse,
Sangers, Ginkel, & Pouw, 2016) presented a
forensic analysis of DJI Phantom 2 Vision+ ,
where flight data related artefacts were
successfully recovered from various components
of the UAV, including the controller, mobile
application and the U AV itself. . The recorded
media of the Phantom 2 Vision+ was found to
possess Exchangeable Image Format (EXIF)
metadata including GPS (Global Positioning
System) information. In the absence of flight
logs, for example if the images were copied to a
separate storage media or the U AV was
damaged in some way, co-ordinates extracted
from EXIF data can be used to recreate a
flight.
An analysis of the DJI Phantom 3
Standard edition (Trujano, Chan, Beams, &
Rivera, 2016) revealed that an IPv4 network is
created between the components of the U AV
system including the drone, controller, onboard camera and mobile devices. The
controller relays commands to the drone via
radio signal. The smartphone running the DJI
GO application connects to the controller via
Wi-Fi or by USB connection, which provides
access to the network. De-compilation of the
DJI GO application revealed the Service Set
Identifier (SSID) and password required to
gain access to this network. The authors also
discussed (Trujano et al., 2016) several
security issues related to DJI Phantom 3
Standard edition.
A detailed security analysis of the DJI
Phantom 3 Advanced edition is presented in
(Luo, 2016). The author identified various
security issues and their countermeasures by
several analyses including firmware analysis,
GPS analysis, radio signal analysis and
Software
Development
Kit
(SDK)
authentication.
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The work reported in (Jain, Rogers, &
Matson, 2017) analysed the basic structure of
five commercially available drones and
proposed some steps, that would aid the digital
investigation of drones. Some of the steps
include, risk assessment , collection of data
from the crime scene, identification of drone
category, weight, fingerprint available on the
drone, data signal in Wi-Fi or Bluetooth,
memory card, and lastly, documentation of
every steps.
Another
article
(Pleban,
Band,
&
Creutzburg, 2014) analysed the security
threats on A.R Drone 2.0, for example, attack
through the Telnet or FTP server or through
Wi-Fi by de-authenticating the real user and
proposed encryption to secure the drone. A.R
drones use an embedded Linux operating
system that governs the flight , camera and
network interfaces. The drone provides an
unsecured (by default) wireless access point.
Once connected, root access to the operating
system is granted via an anonymous telnet
port. Root access presents a number of options
for acquisition, including imaging internal
storage partitions and logical-level copying
(Horsman, 2016).
In a recent work (Barton & Azhar, 2018)
utilised open source tools for forensic analysis
of a multi-platform UAV system. Unlike
commercial toolkits, open source and custom
forensics tools have the ability to be tested by
the open source community, meeting what are
known as the "daubert" guidelines for the
admissibility of evidence provided by expert
witnesses (Carrier, 2002). The freedom of using
open source tools is another advantage over
the costly commercial (Zanero & Huebner,
2010). Furthermore, successful custom tools
created for one specific case, can be adapted in
other cases involving similar technology.
However, the support available in the form of
updates,
bug reporting and additional
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documentation is an advantage of commercial
toolkits.
Most of the studies reported above focused
on the extraction of automated flight plans
and analysis of media utilising methods
applicable to specific models of drones. The
investigation presented in this paper will focus
on the extraction and interpretation of wider
range of important artefacts found both on the
internal memory of the drones and the
controlling application with the use of open
source tools and some generic methods that
can be applied to both the DJI Phantom 3
Professional and the A.R. Drone 2.0 Power
edition, as well as testing anti-forensics
measures.

3. JVIETHODOLOGY
The study reported in this paper focusses on
two drones and the accompanying mobile
platform - a Motorola Moto G 3rd Generation
'
as shown in Tables 1 and 2. Android is chosen
as the mobile platform because of its
dominance in mobile market (Gartner, 2018)

and its huge online developer community,
which comes from its open source status. Prior
to analysis, a custom community built based
on universal open-source Android software
'
CyanogenMod (CyanogenMod, 2017), was
installed on the platform. CyanogenMod
includes forensically sound rooting feature
which does not require further modification
and is tested to the same standards as stock
operating systems (Karlsson & Glisson, 2014).
The scenario creation was performed before
rooting took place. Alongside the Motorola
Moto G 3rd Generation, a Samsung Galaxy S4
Mini running a stock Android 4.4.4 operating
system as a second platform, rooted using
Kingo Root (KingoApp, 2017), was test ed to
ensure consistency between results, with the
same version of the DJI GO application
installed. No noticeable difference was found in
the data structures created by both
applications on the internal storage media of
the platforms.

Table 1.
Drones

Specifications
Name

DJI
Phantom
Professional
A.R Drone 2.0
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3

Price

Weight

£699.99

1280g

£299.99

380g /
420g

Camera
Resolution
4K (12
Mega pixels)
720p (0.9
Mega pixels)

Range
5Km
50m
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Table 2.
Mobile Platforms

Android
Version

CyanogenMod Kernel Version
Version

Installed
Application

Motorola Moto G Moto G3
3rd Generation

5.1.l(Lollipop
)

12.1 (Osprey)

DJI GO v3.1.4

Samsung Galaxy GT-I9195I
S4 Mini

4.4.4 (KitKat) N/ A

Name

Model
Number

A scenario was created using the devices by
simulating the use of the drones in a crime, to
generate the required data for acquisition and
analysis as this is a necessary and established
part of forensic research ( Azhar & Barton,
2016). Because of potential privacy and safety
concerns of using drones, as mentioned earlier,
selection of the location and tests of the
devices were conducted following legal
guidelines on drone safety (CAA, 2015) . A
suitable remote area with tall building
structures and open space was chosen to test
the capabilities of the drones. Four waypoints
over about a 150m radius were established to
test both the manual and automatic function
of the drones.
An artefact-driven analysis was performed
on the UAVs and the mobile platforms and
were divided into three categories. The first of
these is identification of suspects. In this case,
a suspect is most likely to be the user of the
drone, and therefore the main area of interest
in identification is the method of control,
especially via smartphone. Each drone included
in this project uses a slightly different method
of control, all with smartphones. The DJI
Phantom, for example, uses a physical
controller in conjunction with commands from
the smartphone, transmitted to the drone
(DJI, 2018) whereas the A.R Drone 2.0 uses
direct connection from the smartphone to the
drone via Wi-Fi and Bluetooth respectively.
Each of these methods will leave a different
footprint on the drone and identifying artefacts
such as MAC (Media Access Control) address

@ 2018 ADFSL

3.10.49g55f6ac8

3.10.28-5334500 DJI GO v3. l .4

and phone model, operating system etc. will be
crucial m reducing a suspect pool in
investigations.
Another category of artefacts related to
drones is the interpretation of the flight data.
These were collected via various sensors
present on the UAV systems. Some key data of
interest were GPS readings, battery levels,
altitude, acceleration, speed. Analyses of these
data can reveal the actions of the drone during
flight . For example, GPS co-ordinate can
reveal from where the drone took off, or in the
event of a crash, battery levels can reveal the
time when the drone failed as it can be
correlated with time. These data can also be
used to re-construct the flight, which is
especially important when the drone has been
used in smuggling or other flight-related crime.
The category of artefacts related to drones
is the extraction of artefacts from recorded
media which includes any photos or videos
taken by the device's camera. All of the drones
are fitted with at least one camera which is
controllable
through
the
smart phone
application or controller. The use of drones as
bombers by ISIS was all recorded via the
drone's on-board camera in order to produce
videos (Waters, 2017), and the capture and
analysis of such a bombing drone would be
able to reveal actual and potential targets and
measures such as evacuation can take place.
The DJI is equipped with a high-end camera
capable of high resolution photos and videos,
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while the A.R is equipped with two fixed lower
resolution cameras.
Because of the acquisition and the analysis
of the artefacts performed on multi-platforms,
including the UAV systems, mobile devices,
and removable storage, a variety of file systems
and interfaces were encountered. Development

environments for forensics tools include
scripting tools for the Linux operating system
such as Bash, Perl and Python, as well as
·
1anguages sue h as "C"
compiled programmmg
.
A forensic workstation running Kali, a
distribution of Linux, with several forensics
and cybersecurity tools was used, as listed in
Table 3.

Table 3.
Forensic uti ities.

Computer used

Operating
system

Toshiba Satellite
L450D

Kali

Utilities
ls: Listing

Linux

dd: Data Dump

Rolling

mount: Mount command

Update

dmesg: System Logging
file: File signature identification
script: Terminal recording feature
arp: Address Resolution Protocol
telnet: Remote Access
uname: Version Identification
cp: Copy
cat : Print file contents
bash: Scripting environment

3 .1

Mobile Forensics

Mobile forensics were performed to analyse the
data of the DJI GO (DJI, 2018)and A.R
Freeflight (Parrot, 2017) applications, which
were installed via the Android app store. As
mentioned in Section 3, a Motorola Moto G
3rd Generation running a customised version
of Android, CyanogenMod (CM) version 12.1
(CyanogenMod, 2017), was used as the test
mobile platform. This operating system
provide rooting, which is necessary to access
portions of internal storage that are protected
by the operating system's security (Azhar &
Barton, 2016). With this customised operating
system the root access was granted natively
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without needing to install third-party rooting
software, which is a forensically sound option
when methods such as chip-off analysis are not
available.
Once the test platform was
connected to the forensic workstation via USB ,
root terminal access was granted using
Android Debug Bridge (ADB) (Android,
2017). The "userdata" partition was identified
by
running
the
command
"ls
/ dev / block/ bootdevice / by-name" as shown in
Figure 1. A forensic image of this partition was
created using the "dd" command, as shown in
Figure 2. This created an image on a
removable microSD card attached to the test
platform, which was copied to the forensic
workstation for analysis.
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1 r--wxr--wxr--wx root
roo t
1970 -01- 02
root
1 n"x r--wx rwx roo t
1970 -01- 02
1 nNX r-v,ix 1-wx roo t
1970-01-02
root
1 1-wx 1-wx 1-wx roo t
roo t
1970-01-02
1 r--wx r--wx r--wx roo t
roo t
1970-0 1- 02
root@osprey_umts: / de v/ block / bootde vi ce/by-name #
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11
11
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11

•

: 35
: 35
: 35
: 35
: 35

t= -> / dev / b1ock / mmcb1k0p6
t=Ba ckup -> / dev/b1ock/m mcb1k0p l 3
userda ta -> / de v/ b1ock / mmcb1k0p42
utags -> / de v/ b1ock / mmcb1k0p8
utagsBac kup - > / de v/ b1ock / mmcb1k0pl5

Figure 1. Sample listing of mounted partitions on Android platform.

, oo t@ osp rey umt s : / de v/ b1ock/ boo tde vi ce/ by-narne # dd if= / de v/ b1 ock/ rnrn c b1k0p42 of=/rnnt/sdca ,dl /rno t oro1a drone irnage.dd
3685953+0 ,-ec O Id s rn
3685952+0 record s out
1887207424 bytes tran s ferred in 705 . 899 secs (2673480 bytes/sec)

Figure 2. Forensic imaging of "mmcblk0p42" partition using "dd" command

However, upon attempting to mount the
image, the format was not recognised.
Identifying this partition in the output of the
"mount" command on the test platform
revealed that the "userdata" partition is
formatt ed in the Flash Friendly Filesystem, or
"f2fs," which is designed specifically for flash
storage devices (Lee et al., 2015). After
checking compatible filesystems on the forensic

workstation using the "cat / proc/ filesystems"
command, it appeared that the "f2fs" file
system was not supported by Kali. To
overcome this, the "f2fs-tools" (f2fs-tools)
package for debian was installed. However, on
attempting to mount the image again, the
mount command returned errors, shown in the
output of the "dmesg" command in Figure 3.

: /111,·di.i/11111t/\Al1',lltli,/ll11iv,·1-.,ity/l1i-.,-.,,·1t.iti,,r1/A11.ily-.,i-.,/i111.iq,•-.,# dmesg I tail
960 . 180 197 ] de vi ce -mapper: i oc tl: 4.33.0-ioctl (20 15- 8- 18) initialised : dm-deve1@redhat.com
960 . 214816] l oop : module loaded
1075 . 651068 ] F2F S-fs (dm-0 ) : Magi c Mi s mat ch, va1id (0x f2f5201 0) - read (0x0)
1075 . 651075] F2FS-fs (dm- 0) : Can 't find valid F2FS file sys tem in 1th s uperbl oc k
1075 . 65 1112] F2F S-fs (dm- 0) : Magi c Mi s mat ch, va1id (0x f2f52 010) - read (0x0)
1075 . 651115] F2F S-fs (dm-0 ) : Can 't find valid F2FS file sys tem in 2th superblock
1075.651119] F2FS -fs (dm- 0) : Magi c Mi sma t ch, va1id (0x f2f52 010) - read (0x0)
1075 . 65 1121] F2FS -fs (dm- 0) : Can 't find valid F2FS file sys tem in 1th s uperbl oc k
1075 . 65 112 3] F2F S- f s (dm- 0) : Ma gi c Mi s mat ch, va1id(0 xf2f52 010) - read (0x0)
1075.651125] F2FS- f s (dm-0) : Can 't find valid F2FS file sys tem in 2th s uperblock
Figure 3. Error messages from attempting to mount "userdata" forensic image

At a glance, it seemed that the file system
was corrupted, making the image unreadable.
To fix this, the image would have to be
modified. A copy of the image was made in
order to maintain forensic soundness if
modifications were later questioned in a court
of law. Then, the tool "fsck.f2fs" from "f2fstools," a version of the "fsck" tool designed to
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work with "f2fs" file systems, was used on the
image. The "fsck" tool automatically scans for
file system errors and corrects them. A portion
of the output is seen in Figure 4. After this
was completed, the image was successfully
mounted on the forensic workstation and was
ready for analysis, as seen in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Successfully mounted forensic image.

3.2

Drones

As mentioned in Section 3, flight data such
as GPS readings, altitude, speed, acceleration
and battery levels were collected via various
sensors present on the both the U AV systems.

artefacts is shown in Figure 6. Following the
methodology described in Section 3, a number
of flights were conducted with the DJI
Phantom, as listed in Table 4. This list is the
practical log of flights taken on the day rather
than data obtained from analysis of the UAV.

1) DJI Phantom 3 Professional:

An
operational diagram of DJI with potential

DJI GO Application
P,er:son Identifiable
Information
Flight Data Lo gs
(GPS, Sp,eed.,
Batte1y Level)
Capturn& Me<lia
Serial N u.mher
Acquisition method:
Mo bite forensics

I

USB / 2.4GHz

Wi-Fi

DJI Phantom 3 Profossional UAV

<!), ,<!)
00

Flight Data (Temporal)
Serial Number
Acquisition method: acoess via
network

Controller Footprint
Capture& Media

Serial Number
Pairing Information
Acquisition method.: Imaging
r,emovable media and internal s.torage

Figure 6. DJI Phantom 3 Professional operation and potential artefacts
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Once the flights had been performed, the
DJI was taken back to a forensics lab for
analysis . The primary method of data storage
for the DJI Phantom is the removable micro
SD card slot. During the test flight, a 16GB
micro SD card was inserted, which was
provided with the UAV itself. To analyse this
media, the card was mounted to the forensic
workstation and an image was created using
the "dd" command. This is a forensically sound
method of acquisition as the device does not
need to be powered on. An initial check of the
image using the Linux "file" command shows
the card is formatted in the 32-bit File
Allocation Table (F AT32) file system.
The SD card's format is commonly found
on many mass storage devices and it was
analysed using various Linux utilities. The
recorded media produced by the DJI stores
some useful information, including GPS data,
in the EXIF portion of the file. In order to
interpret this data, the command line tool
"exiftool" (exiftool) was used. Data extracted
from the UAV's mass storage devices were
then correlated with artefacts extracted from
the DJI GO mobile application, to highlight
links between the controlling application and
the UAV. The controller in this case does not
seem to have any digital storage capacity of
interest and was excluded from the scope of
this investigation.

@ 2018 ADFSL

JDFSL V13Nl
Another area of interest is the UAV's
internal mounted storage. This is a micro SD
card permanently attached to the main board
of the UAV. To access this storage device, the
U AV must be switched on and put into "Flight
Data Mode" through the DJI GO application.
The U AV was then connected to the forensic
workstation via USB and the drive, named
"DJI FLY LOG," was mounted. Analysis of the
file system using "fsstat" showed the drive was
formatted in FA T32, and a forensic image of
the drive was acquired using the "dd"
command. Upon examination, the drive
contained a number of "FLYXXX.DAT" files ,
which were detailed flight logs, created by the
DJI's internal operating system and stored in a
proprietary format (Kovar et al., 2015). These
files were copied to a removable storage device
for further analysis. There are many online
services offering interpretation of these files,
however uploading evidence to a third-party
server is not appropriate for a forensic
investigation or intelligence purposes, so a tool
designed to interpret and visualise these files,
"CsvView" was downloaded and installed to a
separate machine running Windows, connected
to the internet. The tool was established with
a Google Maps API key, allowing it to
download imagery from the Google Maps
database.
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Table 4.
Fl'i_q.ht record.

Flight
1

2

3

4

W aypoints
Start
End
Description, Notes and Recorded Media
Time
Time
13:57 Travelled a short distance north 13:18 Test flight for compass calibration
of the Home Point before
returning.
14:05 Waypoint 1: 14:06
14:15 Manual flight , GPS assisted, 1 photo and
Waypoint 2: 14:07
one short video taken at each waypoint.
Waypoint 3: 14:12
Waypoint 4: 14:14
14:17 Automatic
Reconnaissance 14:22 Automatic Flight, GPS Assisted , Using
Flight
DJI's built-in Point Of Interest (POI)
Auto Land (Return to home)
function , which makes the drone rotate
14:22
around a specified point. Video was
recorded the entire flight.
14:34 (Same waypoints at Flight 2, 14:37 In this flight, foil was attached to the drone
time not recorded due to
covering the GPS module. The drone was
operated completely manually independent
operator concentrating on flight)
Manual Landing
of GPS. This simulated the intentional
obfuscation of GPS signals as mentioned in
related work [15] [16].

2) A.R Drone 2.0: An operational diagram
of the A.R Drone 2.0 with potential artefacts is
shown in Figure 7. A single flight, with the
aim of collecting photos and media from the
UAV and generating data on the A.R free
flight application, was performed according to
the procedure listed in section 3. Further flight
was decided against due to safety concerns
over wind levels.
The structure of the A.R Drone 2.0's
system results in three areas of interest for
forensic artefacts, including the artefacts
generated by the A.R Freeflight application
and stored on the UAV's internal and
removable storage. The application data was
acquired using the methods described m
section 3.1, and the removable storage media,
a 512Mb flash drive formatted in the FAT32
file system, was connected to the forensic
workstation and a forensic image created using
the "dd" command for later analysis.
The A.R Drone 2.0 does not have any
hardware ports allowing access to the internal
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storage, meaning the only method of access
was through the UAV's Wi-Fi network. This
method has been used by both digital forensics
and cyber security researchers to acquire data
and investigate the drone (Horsman, 2016).
When switched on, the A.R becomes a Wi-Fi
hotspot with the SSID "ardrone2," without any
form of authentication. This has become a hot
topic for security researchers and has even
allowed for the development of automated
drone hacking tools which target the weak
security of drones such as the A.R (Pleban et
al., 2014). Connecting to this network and
interfacing with the UAV will invariably
change digital data on the device. Therefore,
all actions taken should be in accordance with
the Association of Chief Police Officers
(ACPO) good practice guidelines for handling
digital evidence (ACPO, 2012) principles 2;
the person acquiring the data must be
competent and give evidence for their actions,
and 3; that an audit trail of processes should
be created and preserved. The lack of other
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routes into the A.R's internal memory is
enough to fulfil principle 2 if actions taken are
later questioned, and for principle 3, a
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complete log will be kept using the Linux
"script" tool, which records all terminal
commands in a text file.

2 .4 GHz Wi-Fi

A.R Frne,£1:ight Application

A.R Drone 2-0 UA\

P,erson Identifiable
Information
Flight Data Lo gs
(Accelerometer, Batrei:y
L-evd, Ultrasonic
Altimeter)
Captured Media
Serial Number

ControUer Footprint
Captured Media
Serial Num.her
Acquisition method: Imaging rnmovabl,e
media, access vianenvork

Acquisition method.: Mo bile
forensics
Figure 7. A.R Drone 2.0 Power edition operation and potential artefacts

.. . .. .

...

@:ript star·ted on Sun 26 Mar· 2017 18:15:39 BST
A[]0;root@lab: -/dronesAGA[[01;3lmroot@labA[[00m:A[[01;34m-/dronesA[[00m# arp -a
gateway (192.168.1.1) at 90:03:b7:92:53:38 [ether] on ·wlan0
A[]0;root@lab: -/dronesAGA[[01;3lmroot@labA[[00m:A[[01;34m-/dronesA[[00m# nmap 192.168.1.1
Starting Nmap 7.12 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-03-26 18:15 BST
mass_dns : warning: Unable to determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is disabled. Try using --system-dns or speci$
Nmap scan r·epo r·t for- 192 . 168 . 1 . 1
Host is up (0.0094s latency) .
Not shown : 997 closed ports
PORT
STATE SERVICE
21/tcp
open ftp
23/tcp
open telnet
5555/tcp open freeciv
MAC Address : 90:03:B7:92 :53:38 (Parrot)
Nmap done : 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.67 seconds
A[]0;root@lab: -/dronesAGA[[01;3lmroot@labA[[00m:A[[01;34m-/dronesA[[00m# telnet 192.168.1.1
Trying 192 . 168 . 1.1 . ..

Figure 8. Identification and connection to UAV

Once connected to the A.R's access point,
querying the forensic workstations ' Address
Resolution Protocol (ARP) table using the
command "arp - a" shows that the U AV has
the local address "192.168.1.1." Running a port
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scan against this address using the "nmap"
(nmap) tool reveals three open ports, 21, 23
and 5555. Service scans from the "nmap" tool
showed they were File Transfer Protocol
(FTP) and telnet ports respectively, with port
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5555 being erroneously identified as "freeciv,"
an online gaming protocol. Attempting to
connect to the telnet port using an anonymous
username gave instant root access to the
UAV's underlying operating system. The log
for this process is seen in Figure 8.
Upon connection the telnet welcome
message identified as running "busybox"
version 1.14.0, a compiled set of binaries that
provides a number of Linux utilities and is
usually deployed on embedded devices where
space is a premium. Running the "uname - r"
command showed the U AV was running Linux
version 2.6.32. , which was released in 2009
(Kernel, 2009). The "mount" command showed
two
partitions
of
interest;
"/ tmp/ udev/ dev/ sdal" was identified as being
the removable storage media of the U AV,
mounted using the Virtual FAT (VF AT)
filesystem
which
provides
backwards
compatibility with FAT devices, and the
"ubi2:data" partition formatted in the Unsorted
Block Image file system (UBIFS). The use of
UBIFS presents a challenge for forensic
imaging because it is a "raw" file system that
does not support logical block addressing in
the same way that file system such as FAT
and NTFS do. UBIFS uses the same flash
hardware as other block devices, but without
hardware logical block addressing, the
partition could not be imaged directly using
the "dd" tool as it is based on logical blocks. A
possible solution to this problem involved
compiling a UBIFS block interface on the
U AV. After several failed cross-compilation
efforts from the forensic workstation to the
U AV, at attempt was made to compile the
block interface on the UAV directly. However,
the lack of a suitable build environment,
including a package manager, configuration
tools and even compiler in the U AV system
meant that this option would require extensive
changes to data within the U AV and was
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discontinued in favour of logical level
acquisition. This was performed by mounting a
forensic mass storage device to the U AV and
copying files from the mounted "/ data"
partition using the "cp" command.

4.RESULTS
This section covers the key findings from the
analysis described in Section 3. The results are
broken down into three different areas of
interest; the removable storage used by the
U AV, the internal storage of the U AV and the
results of the mobile forensic analysis on the
DJI GO application in DJI Phantom 3
Professional and A.R Freeflight application in
A.R Drone 2.

4.1

DJI Phantom 3 Professional

1) SD Card: As described in section 3.1 ,
images acquired on DJI Phantom micro SD
card was mounted to the forensic workstation
and output from the "tree" command, shows
two directories, DCIM and MISC as shown in
Figure 9. The DCIM directory contains a
wealth of .JPG, .DNG and .MP4 files, all of
which are common media file formats. The file
found under the LOG directory was a firmware
upgrade log for the U AV. It refers to the file
"P3S _FW _ v0l.10.0090.bin," located on the
root of the SD card, meaning that file is the
firmware
update
itself.
Other
useful
information in this log includes a version
history of the firmware, up to the current
version. The THM directory appears to contain
thumbnails generated from each flight.
To analyse the EXIF Data of the stored
media files, "exiftool" (exiftool) was run against
the DCIM/ lO0MEDIA directory. On initial
inspection, GPS co-ordinates are stored under
a "GPS Position" EXIF tag. To automate the
process of extracting the GPS co-ordinates and
create a timestamped GPS flight log, a simple
script was created, as shown in Figure 10.
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M.:ae
idx
:i.dx

I; _
s>38 _X_

-

a:

• •_n._vo
• r-

or -

,

1

f".i 1

Figure 9. Output of tree command

ex 1ft oo1 '

-c " 0o.6f 0o.6f 0o.6f"

egrep 'GPS Positionl(reate Date'

Figure 10. Script to retrieve GPS data from media EXIF information

111111

111,1

Create Date
GPS Positio n
Create Date
GPS Posit io n
Create Date
Trach. Create Date
Media Create Date
GPS Positio n
Create Date
GPS Positio n
Create Date
GPS Pos it io n

I·,', i

111°1 ,11MI 111 A# -/drones/d j i/sc ript .sh

20 17 : 04 : 01 14 : 07 : 30
51. 000000 15 .000000
2017:04 :01 14 : 07 : 30
51 . 000000 15 .000000
20 17 : 04 : 01 14 : 07 : 46
2017:04:01 14 : 07 : 46
2017:04:01 14 : 07 : 46
51 . 000000 15 .000000
20 17 : 04:0 1 14 : 09 : 10
51 . 000000 15 .000000
2017:04:01 14 : 09 : 10
51 . 000000 15 .000000

28 . 380300 N. 0 . 000000 36 . 000000 53 406800
28 . 380800 N. 0 . 000000 36. 000000 53 . 412300 E

28 . 378800 N. 0 . 000000 36 . 000000 53 39 1600 E
27 . 342900 ~I. 0 . 000000 36 000000 54 332000
27 . 347600

0 . 000000 36 . 000000 54 . 334400 E

Figure 11. Sample of output from EXIF GPS extractor script

The script executed "exiftool" on all files in
the directory, formatting the GPS data to 6
decimal places. The output was then filtered to
only contain the 'GPS Position' and 'Create
Date,' which denotes when the picture or video
was taken. The output of this script is shown
in Figure 11.

2) Internal Storage: The files extracted
from the internal storage of the DJI Phantom
were analysed using "CsvView" tool (Csv,
2017). The DJI Phantom 3 operating system
began recording flight data from the moment
the U AV is switched on. This meant as flights
1-3 listed in Table 4 were performed in the
same session of drone activity, the data for
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those flights were recorded in one file,
After
processing
using
"FLY012.DAT."
"CsvView" tool, which converts the file from a
.dat to a .csv format, the flights were
visualised using the "GeoPlayer" function,
which utilised the Google Maps API Key
mentioned in section 3.2. A copy of this
visualisation is shown in Figure 12, with each
flight, waypoints 1-4 and point of interest
(POI) highlighted. It is worth noting the
supreme accuracy displayed by the automatic
flight function in flight 3, in comparison to the
other manual flights . The DJI Phantom was
able to compensate for wind and other external
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factors flying at a constant altitude with
minimal deviance from the set path.
Because it is constantly recorded , the GPS
data alone is not enough to distinguish
between individual flights. The DJI Phantom
flight recorder produces a host of other
artefacts . Plotting these artefacts against each
other using the "CsvView" tool provides a
comprehensive understanding the actions taken
by the drone. Figure 3.1.2.2 shows the flight

time (green), which remains constant under
periods of non-activity, as well as the
barometric altitude (blue) and the total
voltage level of the battery (purple) of the
UAV. When compared with each other, it can
be deduced that there was three distinct
periods of movement and altitude changes by
the drone, were interpreted as flights. The
possible artefacts recoverable from these logs
are extremely detailed and are more than
necessary to recreate a flight.

Flight 3
Flight 2

Figure 12. Annotated visualisation of flights 1-3
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Figure 13. Flight time, barometric altitude and total battery voltage plotted using CsvView.
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Figure 14. Garbage GPS data from flight 4

The file "FLY014.DAT" file was identified
as being the log for flight 4, listed in Table 4.
The "GeoPlayer" visualisation for this flight
showed that the GPS data recorded was
mostly garbage data that had no relation to
the actual flight , as shown in Figure 14.
According
to
the
Operator's
previous
experience, the recommended amount of GPS
signals was about 11, but with the foil
obstructing the unit, the DJI struggled to
receive enough GPS data to successfully
triangulate a position. To confirm this was the
case, the flight time and "numSats" (number of
satellites) readings from the flight logs were
compared, and showed that during flight , the
"numsats" reading was 0, as shown in the time
period (X-Axis) of O to 370 in Figure 15. The
foil was removed after the flight due to fears of
overheating the drone through obstruction of
the cooling vents.

obstructed simply by covering the module with
aluminium foil. It is quite likely that in a crime
scenario, this measure would be taken to
prevent later forensic analysis of the flight
path, or to evade no fly zones. In this case,
investigators must instead rely on other data
from the flight log. The DJI Phantom 3
Professional is equipped with accelerometers,
which record the acceleration in an axis
relative to the UAV in metres/ second2 . Figure
16 shows these readings when plotted against
the flight data shown in the previous figure.
These measurements can be used to
reconstruct a flight in 3D space, relative to an
arbitrary home point. While it would be
possible to perform this analysis manually, the
frequency of measurements taken by the
Phantom make it unreasonable, and it would
be better to develop a tool to do this
automatically.

This confirms findings from related work
(Maarse et al., 2016) that the GPS can be
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Figure 15. CPS health plotted against flight time for flight 4
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Figure 16. Plotted accelerometer data for flight

3) DJI GO Application: Artefacts from the
DJI GO application were located in different
locations within the "userdata" partition of the
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android test platform, which was acquired
using methods described in section 3.1. A list
of these useful directories is shown in table 5.

@ 2018 ADFSL

Drone Forensic Analysis Using Open Source Tools

JDFSL V13Nl

Table 5
List of useful directories from DJI GO Application

P ath

T y pe of
Artefact

/ media/ 0/ DJI/ dji.pilot/ LOG/
CACHE

F light Data

/ media/ 0/ DJI/ dji.pilot/ LOG /
CACHE/ NFZ

F light Data

This is a log of activity relating to the DJI's built -in no
fly zone function and contains information such as GPS
location.

/ media/ 0/ DJI/ dji.pilot/ LOG /
ERROR - POP - LOG

Flight Data

An error log from the U AV containing information on
satellite data not being available.

/ media/ 0 / DJI/ dji.pilot / DJI _
RECORD

Media

A number of videos taken during flight na med as a date
in the format "YYYY - MM - DD - hh - mm - ss" and
stored with the "mp4" file extension. For each video file,
t here is also a corresponding text file. This contains GPS
data, manufacturing information and capture dates .

/ media/ 0/ DJI/ dji.pilot/ Flight
Record

F light Data,
Person
Identifying
Information,
UAV Serial
Number

/ media/ 0/ DJI/ dji.pilot/ CAC
HE - IMAGE

Media

D escriptio n
Contains a number of logs relating to drone activity

This directory contains flight data relating to a number
of flights. A string search of these files revealed the
presence of the "cccu phantom" string, which was the
name assigned to the UAV during setup.

Thumbnails of various images and videos taken during
flight, seemingly random.

The flight record files extracted from the
"FlightRecord" directory were analysed using
the "CsvView" tool for comparison to the .DAT
flight logs extracted from the Phantom's
internal storage. Upon inspection, the files
were confirmed to be flight data stored in a
similar format to the .DAT files, but with
notable differences. Firstly, the resolution of
the recorded data is much lower, with the DJI
GO application flight records being between
l Kb and 1Mb, whereas the .DAT files from t he
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U AV were much larger, often several hundred
Megabytes. Secondly, files were recorded per
flight from take-off to landing rather than per
session of activity, meaning it was clearer when
distinguishing between flights. The .txt files
also had noticeably more metadata than the
.DAT files - including serial numbers of the
UAV and the DJI smart battery, application
version information and the operating system
of the test platform, as shown in Figure 17.
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droneType

P3 Advanced

dateTime
app Version

2017/04/ 0 1 12:59 :44.964
3. 1.4

..

batterySN

1589

.

032 1013321
Android

"'

appType

Figure 17. Metadata from DJI GO application flight log

As well as this metadata, several other
streams of flight data relating to use of the DJI
GO application were available. The "flyCState"
attribute described whether the Phantom was
in manual or automatic mode. Figure18 shows
the distance of the U AV from the home point
plotted against the "flyCState" attribute during
flight 3. The automatic POI function generated
a clearly visible sine wave in the distance
measurements during the time when the U AV
was in automatic flight mode. This may be a
useful artefact in identifying when the POI
function has been used.

While the GPS data for flight 4 was also
destroyed by the foil covering the GPS
receiver, it was also possible to extract the
GPS location of the controlling application.
This is a crucial finding as it allows for the
location of the operator at the time of flight.
Anti-forensics measures to counteract this may
include GPS spoofing on a software level on
the mobile platform, which is possible with free
applications available on app markets such as
google play.
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Figure 18. UAV Flight state plotted against distance from home point for flight 3

4.2

A. R Drone 2.0

1) Internal Storage: The mass storage device
was mounted to the forensic workstation for
examination of the files acquired from the
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U AV. A number of files of interest were
located, as listed in Table 6.
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Table 6
List o.f files acquired from A. R Drone 2. 0 Internal Storage

Path

Type

Description

Syst em log, containing det ails of
various software and hardware
events from the UAV's internal
operating syst em.
Configuration file for the UAV.

/ dat a/ syslog.bin

/ dat a/ config.ini

/ dat a/ emergency. bin

/ dat a/ custom. configs / sessions/

Unidentified binary file. Further
work should identify the
importance of this file and it's
cybersecurity implications.
Directory containing several files
named "config.xxxxxxxx.ini"

Directory containing a file named
"config.xxxxxxxx.ini."
/ dat a/ custom.configs / profiles/

The amount of data present in the system
log located at "/ dat a/ syslog.bin" meant scripts
were used to analyse threads of output. For
example, the A.R drone's operating syst em
uses a set of processes to access the external
storage with the prefix "UsbKey," including
"UsbKeyMonitor,"
"UsbKeyWriter"
and
"UsbKeyRepairer." The logs from these
methods were retrieved using the command
:'1!1 ,,·1•·•,:'[ 1 ,1r I•

I

··.,, ,1,1i•.i1 :,,11 11 (c1l

Version information, configuration
dat a , mount information, file creation
logs
Drone serial number, software version,
drone name, access point SSID
n/ a

GPS dat a. The UAV does not have a
G PS sensor installed so it likely
originated from the A.R Freeflight
application .
Contains a footprint from the
controlling application with name of
t he mobile platform ,
"Mororola - MotoG3" and a serial
number - "PS721003AJ4K103341."

"cat syslog.bin I grep UsbKey" and then further
filtered. "UsbKeyMonitor" prints the serial
number when a new USB device is attached , so
filtering using the word "Serial" produced a
history of all the USB keys attached to the
UAV , as shown m Figure 19. Other
information such as the vendor and product ID
was also available through this method.
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Figure 19. USB serial number history of UAV

Filtering
the
system
log
for
all
"UsbKeyWriter" outputs gave a history of all
files created on the removable storage, with
syst em times in the Linux log epoch format of
seconds. Filtering for the "Video" outputs gives
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a log of the use of both the UAV's internal
cameras, which video codec is being used and
other details including resolution. Examination
of the "syslog. bin" file give a comprehensive
overview of actions carried out by the UAV's

P age 25

Drone Forensic Analysis Using Open Source Tools

JDFSL V13Nl
operating system. Values found also reflected
values in the "config.ini" files examined in
Table 6. Future work should identify whether
modification of the "config.ini" files would
change data in the system log, for antiforensics purposes.

2) Removable Storage: Based on artefacts
from the system logs, the removable storage
media only serves the purpose of storing media
files captured from the UAV. A list of all files
in the partition using the "tree" command
confirms this to be the case.
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Figure 20. Altitude measurements for the duration of the extracted video file

All the files were videos, stored with the
"mp4" file extension. Photos were taken during
the flight; however, none were present on any
of the UAV's storage media. This is likely due
to the photos being stored on the mobile
device, and videos being too large to transmit
over the network. Examination of the video
files using "exiftool" revealed a number of
artefacts, including creation time, the device
name
"Parrot
AR.Drone."
The
"ARDroneTelemetry" tag was extracted from
one of the videos using the "-b" option. This
appeared as a set of floating point numbers
and integers, with no labels or column headers.
Using heuristics based on knowledge of the
phantom system and known flight data, it was
deduced that the first of the floating points
was a timestamp, as it increased in regular
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increments. Also deduced was that the last
floating point was the altitude of the UAV
during flight, as the values steadily changed,
and matched the approximate value of the
flight. The telemetry data was dumped to a
file for analysis with the command "exiftool - b
- ARDroneTelemetry
media20170401 _ 150213 / vide
o _ 20170401 _ 150249.mp4> - / drones/ parrot/ gn
uplot / telemetry." A basic script was created to
convert the data to a comma-separated value
file , which could then be visualised using the
"gnuplot" tool for Linux (gnuplot , 2017). The
altitude was plotted over the period of the
whole video, as shown in Figure 20. Further
work should be carried out to confirm these
hypotheses regarding the telemetry data for
the A.R Drone 2.0.
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3)

A.R Freeflight Application: The
"userdata/
data/ com. parrot.freeflight"
directory contained several ."xml" files, with
names in the format of "< MAC Address of
mobile platform>
< Timestamp > ." These
appear to correlate with sessions of activity on
the UAV. Each file contains a number of flight
and application session records, with each
XML (eXtendable Markup Language) block
being
named
accordingly.
The
"FLIGHT_DRONE _SERIAL" tag displays a
matching serial number to the one listed in
section 2, meaning these artefacts both exist on
the UAV and the mobile platform and can be
used to connect the two during an
investigation. Another XML file, located in
"userdata/ com. parrot .freeflight / shared
_prefs/ Preferences.xml" held a number of
important artefacts, including the GPS coordinates of the last flight, the email address of
the google account used to download the
application, and when the application was last
opened. This is the first artefact found that
directly links the use of a drone to a user
account, which can later be used to trace a
user.
The A.R Freeflight application has a media
storage
location
m
the
platform's
"userdata/ media/ 0/ DCIM" (Digital Camera
!Mage) directory, which contains all the media
captured by the UAV's cameras. EXIF data
for these files varies, some containing GPS
information which matches the operator
location during the flight, and some only
containing a few details such as the creation
date - it is unclear whether this is due to file
corruption. Again, all GPS readings most likely
originated from the mobile platform as the
UAV does not natively possess a GPS
capability.
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2.0 Power edition, have been investigated in
this paper. Although, there is operational
difference between the drones, a number of
common methods were utilised to recover data
from drones and controlling devices using open
source tools. In comparison to the A.R, the
DJI phantom was found to have an
extraordinarily large number of artefacts
associated with it, because having more sensors
and a higher resolution of data capture, which
comes from its status as a professional device.
In both cases, it was necessary to interpret
flight data collected by the U AVs. At its most
simple, this
involved
interpreting
the
movements of the U AVs in three-dimensional
space. This was simpler with the DJI as it
records GPS automatically and work had
already been done in that area to develop a
tool for easy interpretation of the flight data.
Most of the potential artefacts listed in Section
3 were found on the U AVs or their controlling
systems, and were successfully extracted to
identify a suspect, recreate a flight and capture
media from the devices. Some anti-forensics
methods were also successfully tested. Future
work should look at the automation of drone
forensics, and explore methods discussed in
this paper to other drone models such as DJI
Phantom 4 Pro, DJI Mavic Pro or Parrot
Bebop and different mobile platforms such as
Windows and iOS and especially, integration
of the methods discussed here into commercial
forensic tool-kits.

5. CONCLUSION
Two multi-platform UAV systems - the DJI
Phantom 3 Professional and Parrot A.R Drone
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